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The increased role of foreign 
bank entry in emerging markets 
Ramon Moreno and Agustin Villar
1 
Foreign banks and credit markets 
The past decade has seen a transformation of the role of foreign banks in emerging markets. It has 
been a process that has often aroused considerable controversy, and featured prominently in two 
earlier meetings of Deputy Governors (1998 and 2000).
2 The benefits foreign banks can offer are now 
much more widely recognised. But it would be naive to pretend that there are no drawbacks or no 
difficult choices for local supervisory authorities. The supervisory response to the rapid rise of foreign 
banks is still being refined - and, in some countries, remains an important task. 
Foreign banks have become well established as key vehicles in the international integration of the 
financial systems of emerging market economies. There has been a strategic shift by foreign banks 
away from pursuing internationally active corporate clients towards the exploration of business 
opportunities in the domestic market. One standard indicator of foreign bank presence is the share of 
assets of foreign-controlled banks (Annex Table A1), which has increased significantly in many 
countries. Another indicator of foreign influence is the ratio of local claims of BIS reporting banks to 
domestic bank credit; this is shown in the last column of Table 1. 
It is clear that the degree of foreign penetration has differed sharply across regions. There has been a 
radical transformation in Latin America and central Europe in the space of a very few years. 
Privatisation (in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Brazil and Peru) and the need to recapitalise 
the financial system following financial crises (Mexico and Korea) have been important driving forces. 
In Asia, by contrast, the penetration of foreign banks has been much less (8%). The main exceptions 
are Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Thailand (where the ratio has risen) and Malaysia. 
A development of great importance has been that lending by big local affiliates has progressively 
displaced direct dollar-denominated lending by the head offices of international banks (Table 1, 
column 3). This is potentially a positive development as it can mean greater borrowing in local 
currency and thus smaller currency mismatches. In addition, the deeper local presence of international 
banks may contribute to greater efficiency and resilience of the financial sector. 
The greater scale and changing character of foreign participation in banking systems raise many 
questions: about the impact on the efficiency of financial institutions; about the macroeconomic effects 
on aggregate lending and on the responsiveness to monetary policy; and about the implications for 
financial sector stability. The following paragraphs outline some of these issues. 
The impact on efficiency and aggregate lending
3 
A larger foreign bank presence can enhance the competitiveness of the banking sector. Greater 
competition is desirable for a number of reasons: to enhance the efficiency of financial services; to 
stimulate innovation; and to contribute to stability. It can also widen access of qualified borrowers to 
                                                       
1  Comments by Philip Turner, William White and Dietrich Domanski, advice by Philip Wooldridge and research support by 
Marc Klau are gratefully acknowledged.  
2  The papers for these meetings are in BIS (1999) and BIS (2001). A summary is Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001), pp 24-32. 
3  Additional perspective on the benefits of foreign bank entry is provided by CGFS (2004), Goldberg (2003), Chua (2003), 
Cardenas et al (2003), and Kim and Lee (2003). CGFS (2004) and other country reports also discuss issues from the home 
country perspective which are outside the main focus of this paper. Wolf (2004) is very persuasive on the need for 
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financing, which may increase aggregate lending and so enhance growth.
4 A more competitive and 
efficient banking system can also improve the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission by 
tightening the link between policy rates and deposit/lending rates. 
 
Table 1 












1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003
 
in billions of US dollars  in percentages 
Asia
4   730   471   422   160   308   360    22    65    85    8    10    8 
China    48    58    49   0   3   6    1   6    12    0    0   0 
Hong Kong SAR   241   110    88    96   165   167    40   150   190    48    66    72 
India   16   22   22    8   17   24    54   76    106    7    8    8 
Indonesia   45   40   29    4    5    6    8   11   20    3    6    7 
Korea   78   59   65    8   18   29    11   31   45    3    5    5 
Malaysia   17   21   22    4   29   33    25    139    152    5    30   29 
Philippines    8   17   17    1    5    5    17   32   28    4    13   12 
Singapore    192    100   91   22   32   46    11   32   51    26    29   37 
Taiwan,  China   23   18   21   10   16   26    44   90    120    2    3    6 
Thailand   63   27   17    5   17   19    9   62    113    3    13   15 
Latin America
4   195   260   195    38   222   243    20    85   125    8    41    52 
Argentina   38   69   25    4   23   13    10   34   55    7    29   32 
Brazil   57   68   52   21   72   52    36    107    100    9    31   23 
Chile   14   22   20    8   28   23    58    124    112    25    64   55 
Colombia   11   12    8    1    5    5    8   46   59    5    25   21 
Mexico   57   64   68    4   80    142    8    126    210    3    58    119 
Peru    6   13   11    1    3    3    10   24   27    7    22   21 
Venezuela   12   13   12    0   10    6    3   76   48    2    66   77 
Central and eastern 
Europe
4   76   92    119    4   52   93    5   56   78    3    33   35 
Czech  Republic    8   11   16    2   15   32    31    135    206    6    53   80 
Hungary    9   17   27    1    8   14    8   47   52    5    41   35 
Poland    7   24   35    1   27   44    12    112    125    2    48   55 
Russia    52    40    41   0   1   2    0   2   6    0    2   2 
Other
4    60    95    87   2   7   8    3   8   9    1    2   2 
Algeria    13   5   4   0   0   1    1   7    14    1    2   
Israel   5   8    10   0   0   1    0   3   5    0    0   0 
Saudi  Arabia   8    17    16   0   0   0    1   0   0    0    0   0 
South  Africa   16   18   20    1    4    4    6   20   21    1    5    4 
Turkey    19    47    37   1   3   2    3   6   6    2    3   3 
1  Outstanding positions at year-end; for 2003, end of June.   
2  BIS reporting banks’ cross-border claims in all currencies and 
their foreign affiliates’ local claims in foreign currencies (consolidated banking statistics).   
3  BIS reporting banks’ local claims 
in local currencies.   
4  Total of the countries shown. 
Sources: IMF; BIS. 
                                                       
4  However, performance measures such as bank margins or profitability may not always measure competitiveness 
adequately, because performance may be influenced by other factors such as macroeconomic conditions, taxation and 
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A number of studies have investigated empirically the effects of foreign bank entry on the efficiency of 
the financial sector. The evidence generally suggests that increased entry, including by foreign banks, 
is associated with greater competition. For example, using a data set of regulatory restrictions applied 
in 107 countries in 1999, Barth et al (2001) find that tighter entry restrictions are associated with lower 
bank efficiency (higher interest rate margins and overhead expenditures). Claessens et al (2001) find 
that foreign bank entry tends to reduce profit margins in the banking sector. Demirgüc-Kunt et al (2003) 
find that greater bank concentration is associated with lower bank efficiency in emerging economies. 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that greater foreign bank entry and lack of entry and activity 
restrictions are associated with more competition.
5 Moreover, there is evidence that competitive 
pressures are greater in those areas where foreign banks are active. 
Foreign bank entry can also help countries recapitalise their banking systems in the aftermath of 
banking crises, providing the basis for a revival of bank credit. For example, in 1995 the Mexican 
banking system became insolvent as a result of bad loans and the very high interest rates that 
followed the collapse of the Mexican peso. Notwithstanding considerable government support, bank 
credit to the private sector did not grow for several years. As the system was opened to foreign 
participation, the stronger capital base and the removal of bad loans provided incentives for banks to 
resume lending. As reported in Table 1, the ratio of local claims of foreign-owned BIS reporting banks 
to credit provided by domestic banks in Mexico is 119%. Banks that are more than 50% foreign-owned 
control nearly 82% of banking sector assets (Annex Table A1). 
In stark contrast, however, reliance on foreign banks has been much less in Asian economies affected 
by the 1997 crises. The ratio of international bank local claims to domestic bank credit is 30% in 
Malaysia, 15% in Thailand and still lower in Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines. One interesting 
question is why there has been less reliance on foreign banks in Asia after the Asian crisis than in 
other regions after crises in those regions. Possible explanations could include the high domestic 
saving rates (which kept banks liquid) and large government-financed bailouts. 
The impact on financial and economic stability 
Foreign bank entry may enhance financial stability by permitting greater diversification of exposures 
and by improving risk management. It could also contribute to making more capital or liquidity 
available when needed. 
A foreign bank presence could be particularly valuable during periods of banking stress, to diversify 
against country-specific (systemic) risks that can severely impair the capital of the banking system. 
The fact that foreign banks are diversified across different countries could well change the cyclical 
behaviour of the host country financial system since foreign banks are less sensitive to host country 
cycles. How valuable this proves to be in practice depends on how closely the domestic economic 
cycle is correlated with the global economy. Counter cyclical changes in foreign bank lending could 
also help to amplify the effectiveness of monetary policy. Foreign banks could also be more resilient 
during currency crises. Not only do they tend to be more aware of currency mismatches, they can also 
call on their parent organisations to provide foreign currency liquidity. 
A number of empirical studies suggest foreign banks do indeed play a stabilising role. Using BIS banking 
statistics for a set of Latin American countries over the period 1985-2000, Martinez Peria et al (2002) find 
that, while foreign banks transmit external shocks to their host countries, they become more 
responsive to host country conditions over time and their lending reacts more strongly to positive than 
to negative host shocks. They also find that foreign bank lending is not significantly curtailed during 
crises; hence greater foreign bank participation may be associated with a reduced probability of crises 
(Levine 1996). 
The behaviour of foreign banks during certain crisis episodes illustrates the potentially stabilising role 
they can play. For example, Detragiache and Gupta (2004) find that foreign banks did not abandon the 
local market during the 1997-98 crisis in Malaysia and received less government support than 
                                                       
5  Their measure of bank competition differs from others because it is based on a structural contestability approach. It tests 
whether an increase in input prices raises both marginal costs and total revenues by the same amount as the rise in costs 
(perfect competition), or whether an increase in input prices increases marginal costs, reduces equilibrium output and 
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domestic institutions.
6 In another instance, that lending by foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico grew 
faster than lending by domestic banks during the 1994-95 crises (Goldberg et al (2000)). The 
behaviour of foreign banks in Argentina during that earlier period is confirmed by the paper by Lacoste 
in this volume.  
There are nonetheless three important questions about the role of foreign banks.  
First, a large foreign banking presence could mean that information available to host country 
supervisors can be reduced to the extent that decision-making and risk management shifts to the 
parent bank. The delisting of the equity of local affiliates on the local exchange removes an important 
source of market intelligence. In addition, if the integrated firms’ equities are delisted in the local 
market, host country supervisors can also lose access to key foreign bank decision-makers. 
Second, a large foreign bank presence can expose a country to shocks due to purely external events, 
such as those affecting the parent bank. The factors that determine vulnerability to such external 
shocks, whether the exposure is greater with onshore foreign banking as compared to traditional 
cross-border bank lending, and the implications for regulatory and supervisory policy also warrant 
further investigation. 
A third issue is the regulatory treatment of foreign currency denominated lending. A borrower that 
chooses dollar borrowing to cover local currency business makes itself a worse credit risk - but this is 
often not sufficiently recognised either by the bank in its risk management techniques or by the 
regulators. As Basel II aligns capital requirements more closely to differences in credit risk than 
Basel I, regulatory distortions should be reduced. And over time the more systematic use of default 
data should clarify which foreign currency loans should be regarded as a worse credit risk than local 
currency loans.
7 
The first two concerns have been cited by a report on FDI in the financial sector by the Committee on 
the Global Financial System (CGFS (2004)) and apply to a number of countries, including Mexico and 
New Zealand (see Cardenas et al (2003)) and Bollard (2004). 
The series of events that culminated in Argentina’s financial crisis in 2001 raises several important 
questions. Lacoste finds that foreign banks played no stabilising role in these circumstances.
8 The 
explanation for this conclusion - which contradicts what might have been explained - is not clear. In 
what ways might the response depend on the nature of the shock and on the economic policies 
followed by the host country government? How are regulatory constraints, or the relative ability or 
incentive to access lender of last resort facilities, affected by the shift from cross-border to onshore 
operations? What does this imply for the reaction of foreign banks during periods of financial stress? 
Answers to these questions would have an important bearing on risk management by foreign firms 
and the oversight of foreign regulators. 
Another line of research suggests that foreign bank entry might contribute to greater stability by 
increasing profits, and improving capital cushions, in the banking sector. There is some evidence that 
the rationalisation of banking services following foreign entry (or foreign competition) lowers overhead 
costs and so improves profits. A less satisfactory outcome would be that foreign banks raise profits by 
reducing competition, which appears to occur in some cases.
9 Levy Yeyati and Micco (2003) study the 
evidence for eight Latin American countries and find that foreign bank penetration appears to have led 
to less competitive banking sectors. The higher profits strengthen the financial position of banks and 
lower their risk level. Lower risk is not necessarily due to safer lending by foreign banks compared to 
                                                       
6  They also find that the banks not specialising in Asia were more profitable than banks that did specialise in Asia during the 
crisis, enjoying higher interest margins and fewer non-performing loans. 
7  This issue is discussed in Goldstein and Turner (2004), pp 85-8. 
8  Some empirical evidence that foreign banks may accentuate economic volatility (as measured by year-to-year fluctuations in 
real GDP and investment) in emerging economies is provided by Morgan and Strahan (2003), who study nearly 
100 countries over the period 1990-97. More precisely, volatility is the square or the absolute value of residuals from a first-
stage growth regression of GDP growth (or investment growth) on a set of time fixed effects, country fixed effects, a 
measure of banking integration, and other control variables. However, this study does not directly examine the importance 
of flows associated with the foreign banking sector. 
9  Claessens et al (2001) argue that foreign banks in emerging markets have higher net margins and profitability, as well as 
higher overhead costs, so their higher returns do not appear to be due to higher efficiency. BIS Papers No 23  13
 
domestic banks but rather to higher profits and charter value that the average foreign banks can 
obtain. Foreign banks can do this because their products are not perfect substitutes for the products 
offered by domestic banks. 
Foreign bank entry may also lower risk through improved risk management techniques and more 
realistic provisioning against bad loans. As those techniques become more deeply rooted in the local 
banking culture (and perhaps as the quality of supervisory oversight improves), the stability of the local 
financial system should improve. Nevertheless, two issues are sometimes raised. First, the expertise 
and the extra resources of foreign banks might allow them to take the more profitable and creditworthy 
borrowers away from domestic banks, adversely affecting the profitability of the latter. Kim and Lee 
(2003) suggest that foreign banks may have had this effect in Korea. Second, foreign banks could 
concentrate their lending on large enterprises, instead of small and medium-sized enterprises and 
other creditworthy borrowers that are “informationally opaque”. This argument, which was once a 
fashionable critique of foreign banks, now appears less convincing as foreign banks increasingly 
demonstrate their ability to expand their business with households. In this business, foreign banks 
have brought improvements in credit scoring techniques and in securitisation techniques. 
There is, however, no decisive cross-country empirical evidence that foreign bank entry adversely 
affects lending to small and medium-sized enterprises.
10 One study uses data from four Latin American 
countries to confirm that foreign banks in fact do lend less to small businesses. However, this reflects 
the behaviour of small foreign banks, which may lack the resources to evaluate small borrowers. 
Another study estimates how borrower perceptions of credit conditions are affected by foreign bank 
entry, drawing on a survey of over 4,000 enterprises in 38 developing countries’ economies. It 
concludes that foreign bank penetration improves the access to credit for all firms. Small firms benefit 
even if large firms benefit more. 
Policymakers in emerging economies have sought to enhance credit availability to small borrowers by 
seeking to reduce credit risk in two ways: (1) making information available to facilitate the assessment 
of the creditworthiness of borrowers in the economy, for example via the establishment of credit 
bureaus; (2) making it more costly for borrowers to fall behind in their payments, for example by 
improving the ability of lenders to attach assets. 
                                                       




Foreign ownership of banks 
Assets owned by banks with 
50% or more foreign ownership
1 
Assets owned by banks with 




1990 2000 2002 1990 2000 2002 
China   .   .   .   .   .   . 
Hong Kong SAR    45.7    87.2   88.6   3.7   7.2   6.2 
India   21.0   42.0   40.0   .   4.0   5.0 
Indonesia                   
Korea   .    32.7 
2    32.3   .   7.5
2   14.4 
Malaysia   22.3   24.9   25.2   34.1   30.5   38.7 
Philippines                  
Singapore    89.4   75.7   76.0   …   …   … 
Thailand    –   5.9   5.8   .   45.8   48.6 
Argentina   17.0 
3    48.1   41.6   .   13.4   12.7 
Brazil       25.2   21.5      7.0   6.2 
Chile   18.6   33.1   44.8   5.5   16.5   3.0 
Colombia   3.7 
4   18.0   16.4    6.6 
4   13.7   13.6 
Mexico    0.3   54.6   81.9   .   0.3   0.6 
Peru    0.0   32.6   30.4   10.5   9.2   14.4 
Venezuela       49.7   37.4      7.7   0.8 
Czech  Republic   26.4   65.4   85.8   63.7   22.1   8.3 
Hungary   11.4 
5   69.9   90.4    8.2 
5   23.8    – 
Poland   0.02   69.5   67.4   0.02   1.4   2.1 
Russia   7.2 
6  9.5   8.1   5.5 
6  3.1   2.3 
Israel    .   .   .      20.2   12.8 
Saudi  Arabia   –   –   –   7   6   6 
S o u t h   A f r i c a                    
Turkey    2.9   3.6   3.3   0.8   –   – 
Note: . not available; – nil; … not applicable. 
1  As a percentage of total banking sector assets, at end-year.   
2  2001.   
3  1991 as a percentage of deposits.   
4  1992.   
5  1993. 
6  1998.  
Source: Central banks. 
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